BYU Law Review
Volume 2014

Issue 5

Article 2

November 2014

Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate
Governance
Paul Rose
Bernard S. Sharfman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the Business
Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul Rose and Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate
Governance, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 1015 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2014/iss5/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

01.SHARFMAN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

5/22/2015 4:56 PM

Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in
Corporate Governance
Paul Rose and Bernard S. Sharfman ∗
Under an Arrowian framework, centralized authority and
management provides for optimal decision making in large
organizations. However, Kenneth Arrow also recognized that other
elements within the organization, beyond the central authority,
occasionally may have superior information or decision-making skills.
In such cases, such elements may act as a corrective mechanism within
the organization. In the context of public companies, this Article finds
that such a corrective mechanism comes in the form of hedge fund
activism, or, more accurately, offensive shareholder activism.
Offensive shareholder activism operates in the market for corporate
influence, not control. Consistent with a theoretical framework that
protects the value of centralized authority and a legal framework that
rests fiduciary responsibility with the board, authority is not shifted to
influential, yet unaccountable, shareholders. Governance entrepreneurs
in the market for corporate influence must first identify those instances
in which authority-sharing may result in value-enhancing policy
decisions, and then persuade the board and/or other shareholders of the
wisdom of their policies, before they will be permitted to share the
authority necessary to implement the policy. Thus, boards often reward
offensive shareholder activists that prove to have superior information
and/or strategies by at least temporarily sharing authority with the
activists by either providing them seats in the board or simply allowing
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them to directly influence corporate policy. This Article thus reframes
the ongoing debate on the value of shareholder activism by showing how
offensive shareholder activism can co-exist with—and indeed, is
supported by—Kenneth Arrow’s theory of management centralization,
which undergirds the traditional authority model of corporate
governance.
This Article also provides a much-needed bridge between the
traditional authority model of corporate law and governance as
utilized by Professors Steven Bainbridge and Michael Dooley and those
who have done empirical studies on hedge fund activism, including
Professor Lucian Bebchuk. This bridge helps to identify when shareholder
activism may be a positive influence on corporate governance.
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INTRODUCTION
Shareholder activism can be defined to include any action(s) of
any shareholder or shareholder group with the purpose of bringing
1
about change within a public company without trying to gain
2
control. In contrast to Henry Manne’s famous description of the
3
“market for corporate control,” shareholder activism exists in a
4
“market for corporate influence.” However, both markets share two
important premises: First, there is “a high positive correlation
between corporate managerial efficiency and the market price of
5
shares of that company.” Second, “[a]part from the stock market,
6
we have no objective standard of managerial efficiency.”
The debate on shareholder activism tends to focus on whether
shareholder activism in general is appropriate, with zealous advocates

1. For our purposes, a public company can be defined as a for-profit organization that
is publicly traded but does not have a controlling shareholder. Thus, public companies include
the largest of companies, such as Apple, General Electric, Microsoft, ExxonMobil, IBM, and
General Motors, as well as thousands of other much smaller corporations that are still of
significant size. For a more theoretical definition, see Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of
Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 463 n.9 (1992) (“The term ‘publicly held firm’ is
meant to describe . . . economic organizations in which (i) management and residual claimant
status (shareholding) are separable and separated functions; (ii) the residual claims (shares) are
held by a number of persons; and (iii) the residual claims are freely transferable and neither
entry to nor exit from the firm is restricted.”).
2. Professors Stuart Gillian and Laura Starks note: “Shareholder activists are often
viewed as investors who, dissatisfied with some aspect of a company’s management or
operations, try to bring about change within the company without a change in control.” Stuart
L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States, 19
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 55 (2007).
3. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 115–17 (1965). Manne’s contribution to our understanding of how markets, especially
the stock market, influence corporate governance cannot be understated. See William J.
Carney, The Legacy of “The Market for Corporate Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the
Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1999).
4. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 58 (2011). As pointed out by Henry Manne,
there is a significant inter-relationship between the market for corporate control and the
market for corporate influence. Manne, supra note 3. The development of the market for
corporate influence has no doubt been helped by federal securities and state corporate laws
that have greatly inhibited the market for corporate control.
5. Manne, supra note 3, at 112. Manne used this premise to establish that the control
of corporations may constitute a valuable asset in and of itself. Id.
6. Id. at 113.
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lauding its virtues and opponents drawing attention to its vices. If
shareholder activism is a front in a wider battle between managerial
capitalism—an approach to corporate governance that incorporates
the primary norm of managing the corporation for the benefit of all
stakeholders—and shareholder-centric capitalism—managing the
corporation primarily for the benefit of shareholders—the
7
shareholder-centric model is increasingly gaining control.
Managerial capitalism, whatever its virtues, is fighting a rearguard
8
action against the proponents of shareholder power. This defensive
action is made more difficult by the fact that federal regulation
9
increasingly supports the shareholder-centric view. This support
suggests that shareholder activism will likely continue to be a central
feature of corporate governance for years to come.
Shareholder activism comes in at least two primary forms and
several sub-forms. Performance-driven activism, usually instigated by
hedge funds, focuses on advocating for significant changes in
corporate strategy to increase the market price of a company’s stock.
Corporate governance activism, on the other hand, focuses on
changes in a public company’s governance arrangements, executive
10
compensation, and social policy. In some cases, this second type of
activism is used as a vehicle to achieve the first. For example, an
activist hedge fund may support or even initiate corporate
governance changes, such as the elimination of a staggered board, in
order to reduce managerial insulation, which in turn allows the
hedge fund to more effectively influence performance-driven
corporate changes.
Even though shareholder activism has been a feature of
11
corporate governance for over one hundred years, only recently
7. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 1907, 1911–26 (2013).
8. The decline of managerial capitalism can be directly linked to the rise of the
independent director. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465
(2007).
9. See Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355,
1356–59 (2010) (describing the shareholder-empowering function of numerous recent federal
regulations).
10. James R. Copland, Yevgeniy Feyman & Margaret O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2012:
A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism, CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY AT THE
MANHATTAN INST. 11 (2012), http://www.proxymonitor.org/forms/pmr_04.aspx.
11. See Gillan & Starks, supra note 2. Gillan and Starks trace shareholder activism back
to the early 1900s when U.S. financial institutions were active participants in corporate
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have all the pieces come together for shareholder activism to become
a powerful force in corporate governance. These pieces include the
growing dominance of institutional investors in the investment of
12
publicly held stock, helping to reduce investors collective action
13
costs; the shift from managerial capitalism to shareholder-centric
capitalism, such that the board of a public company now feels an
14
the
increased need to respond to shareholder demands;
Department of Labor’s interpretive bulletin advising pension funds
that proxy voting constituted part of the funds’ fiduciary duties to
15
investors; the related rise of shareholder advisory services such as
16
Institutional Shareholder Services; the rise of hedge funds as
17
shareholder activists and the increasing ability of these hedge funds
to raise large pools of funds so as to seek significant positions in
18
and the SEC’s ideological support of
public companies;
19
shareholder interests. This support is evident in various SEC rules
and policies, including the liberalization of communications between
20
elimination of
shareholders with respect to proxy voting,

governance. Id. They also note that the modern version of shareholder activism received a big
boost in 1942 when the SEC first allowed shareholders to submit proposals for inclusion on
corporate ballots. Id.
12. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865
(2013) (noting that institutional investors hold over 70% of the outstanding stock of the top
thousand U.S. public companies).
13. Collective action costs means that “shareholders generally will not make an effort to
effect governance changes unless the benefits resulting from the efforts equal or exceed the
costs of such an effort. Even when such efforts are made, the benefits may only inure to a
particular shareholder or a small group of shareholders.” Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance
Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 898 (2007).
14. See Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON
HALL L. REV. 909, 913 (2013) (identifying the shift in the structure of pension plans from
defined benefit to defined contribution plans as a significant cause of this increased need to
listen to shareholders). As a result of this shift, pensioners have become less dependent on their
former employers and more dependent on the capital markets for their pension wealth. See id.
15. See Department of Labor Rule on Shareholder Rights Under ERISA, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2509.08-2 (2008).
16. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1277–78 (2008). For a discussion of the costs and benefits of proxy
voting firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services, see Rose, supra note 13, passim.
17. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 12.
18. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 16, at 1278–79.
19. See Rose, supra note 9, at 1359.
20. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
31,326, 52 SEC Docket 2028 (Oct. 16, 1992).
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discretionary broker voting for the election of directors, required
22
disclosure of proxy voting by investment companies, the SEC’s
promulgation of Investment Adviser’s Act Rule 206 (4)-6 in 2003
(requiring investment advisers such as mutual fund companies, to
“[a]dopt and implement written policies and procedures that are
reasonably designed to ensure that [advisers] vote client securities in
23
the best interest of clients”), and some SEC commissioners’ use of
the populist argument that shareholders must take a more active role
to constrain reckless risk-taking by corporate managers in order to
24
prevent another financial crisis.
Such developments mean that shareholder activism is here to
25
stay, and that both sides in the debate must now consider how
activism can be utilized to allow corporate decision making to be
executed in the most efficient manner. This Article seeks to answer
that question by showing how a certain type of performance-driven
activism, offensive shareholder activism (typically as a form of hedge
fund activism), can promote shareholder value and therefore serve a
beneficial role in corporate governance. In an Arrowian framework
of corporate governance, offensive shareholder activism is a
corrective mechanism that can reduce error in corporate decision
making. As evidenced by the empirical studies described below,
offensive shareholder activism has established itself as a legitimate
tool of accountability in corporate governance. The key to the utility
of such activism on an individual company basis is the transmission
of information, from the activist to the board, which can enhance
public company decision making.
21. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 60,215, 96 SEC
Docket 654 (July 1, 2009) (discussing the amendment eliminating broker discretionary voting
for the election of directors).
22. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 8,188, 2003 WL 215451
(Jan. 31, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249, 270, 274).
23. SEC Proxy Voting Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2011).
24. Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J.
CORP. L. 309, 332–35 (2010). This argument is not supported by any evidence that such
shareholder empowerment would actually reduce reckless risk-taking in the financial sector or
that such risk-taking was an issue in the non-financial sectors of the economy leading up to the
2008 financial crisis.
25. This is consistent with Professor Edward Rock’s argument that we have completed
the transition from a manager-centric to a shareholder-centric system of corporate governance;
shareholder activists who claim to carry the mantle of shareholder wealth maximization will
have increased leverage in making their case. See Rock, supra note 7.

1020

01.SHARFMAN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1015

5/22/2015 4:56 PM

Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism

This Article is timely not only because of the general rise of
shareholder activism, but also because the debate on corporate
governance has now shifted to a focus on the market for corporate
influence. Moreover, this Article provides a much-needed bridge
between the traditional authority model of corporate law and
governance, as utilized by Stephen Bainbridge and Michael Dooley,
and those who have empirically studied hedge fund activism,
including Lucian Bebchuk, and have found it to be value enhancing.
The bridge formed in this Article helps to identify when shareholder
activism may be a positive influence on corporate governance.
The discussion that follows, when it references state corporate
law, has been pragmatically framed in the context of Delaware
corporate law. Delaware is the state where the majority of the largest
26
U.S. companies are incorporated, and its corporate law often serves
as the authority that other U.S. states look to when developing their
27
own statutory and case law. Therefore, the primary examples are
from Delaware, but the thinking is meant to be global in nature.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the fundamental
conflict in corporate law that creates shareholder activism. Part II
explains the various categories of shareholders and why only one type
of shareholder, the information trader, has the potential to improve
corporate decision making. Part III examines a specific type of
information trader, the offensive shareholder activist, and what
empirical analysis can tell us about their activism. Part IV discusses
the debate over the alleged short-term time horizon of hedge fund
activists. Part V concludes by discussing how shareholders, boards,
and regulators should understand the proper role of shareholder
activism in corporate decision making.

26. See LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007),
available at corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf (stating that Delaware is the
“favored state of incorporation for U.S. businesses”). According to the State of Delaware
website, Delaware is the legal home to “[m]ore than 50% of all publicly-traded companies in
the United States including 64% of the Fortune 500.” About Agency, STATE DELAWARE,
http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
27. See Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a
Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 397 (2007).
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I. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND
CORPORATE LAW
This Part describes how corporate law centralizes authority in the
board of directors and how shareholder activism challenges this
authority. This Part then introduces the argument that in discrete
situations activism can serve as an important corrective mechanism
within public companies.
Shareholder activism is primarily confined to public companies,
which for our purposes is limited to publicly traded companies with
28
no controlling shareholder. Public companies almost always take
the corporate form, not merely because of limited liability, legal
personality, or transferrable shares—those attributes shared with
other legal entities, such as limited liability companies (LLCs)—but
also because of what can be considered corporate law’s most
underrated attribute: its use of statutory default rules and court
decisions to protect board decision making from shareholder
29
interference.
As Robert Clark observed, “the single most important fact of
30
corporate law is that managerial power is legally centralized.” To
facilitate a centralized, hierarchical management structure, corporate
law provides a public company’s board the exclusive authority to
manage and execute the various forms of explicit and implicit
31
contracts that encompass a firm’s contractual makeup. However,
board involvement in day-to-day operations is not necessary, as
statutory law allows the board to delegate its authority to executive
32
management. This decentralization frees up many board members
from having to participate in the day-to-day management of the
firm, but at the same time consolidates power at the top of a
corporation’s hierarchy—the board and executive management—
without providing shareholders a role in the decision-making
33
process. After all, it is the board who decides what authority is to
28. See supra note 1.
29. This large concentration of corporate authority was first identified by Professor
Adolph Berle and Dr. Gardiner Means writing just after the 1927 and 1929 amendments to
the Delaware General Corporation Laws. See A.A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means,
Corporations and the Public Investor, 20 AM. ECON. REV. 54, 60 (1930).
30. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 21 (1986).
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
32. Id. § 142(a).
33. See Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad
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be delegated and to whom. As a result, there is a significant
imbalance between the authority of the board and the accountability
that shareholders can provide. Shareholder activism can be
understood to be the inevitable response to this imbalance.
Corporate law defers to board authority in many ways, including,
most notably, selecting the board of the directors to be the default
locus of authority for corporate decision making. Corporate law vests
34
in directors the power to control corporate assets, including the
35
payment of dividends and other distributions. The board is not
required to follow the commands of its shareholders, even if
shareholders pass a unanimous resolution requesting the board to act
36
in a specific manner. Shareholders may ratify a board’s action, but
37
the board must first approve the action. Corporate law also
protects the decisions of the board of directors from shareholder
challenge, and to a great extent immunizes the directors from
individual liability, by applying the business judgment rule to even
38
the board’s most harmful or inept business decisions, and allowing

Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2011). Professor Bruner
has pointed out that “enacting, amending, and repealing bylaws are essentially the only
corporate governance actions that shareholders can undertake unilaterally.” Id. Of course, the
management of a public company still gets the advantage of excluding a number of proposals
from its proxy materials under the SEC’s Rule 14a-8(i). See SEC Shareholder Proposals Rule,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012) (explaining when a company must include a proposal in its
proxy materials).
34. Delaware General Corporation Law Section 141(a) provides that “[t]he business
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its
certificate of incorporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
35. See tit. 8, § 170(a).
36. See tit. 8, § 141(a). See also, Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“A
cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors,
rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation.”), overruled on
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). For a discussion of how
corporate law retains decision-making power in the board of directors, even where a majority
of shareholders oppose the board’s decision, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 841 n.8 (2005).
37. For example, when a corporation has decided to proceed with a merger proposal,
the statutory process requires that the board of directors take the lead by initiating the
proposal with the shareholders participating by voting on the proposal. See tit. 8, § 251(b).
38. According to the Delaware Supreme Court:
Our law presumes that “in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company.” Those presumptions can be
rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care
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for exculpation clauses to relieve directors of personal liability for
39
alleged breaches in their duty of care. Directors also have the right
to implement defensive measures to ward off an unwelcome takeover
bid through the application of the Unocal test, even when a majority
40
of shareholders may be willing to accept the bid.
Corporate law promotes centralized management because it
recognizes that a centralized, hierarchical authority—the board of
directors—is necessary for the successful management of a large forprofit organization such as a public company. According to Clark,
hierarchies in large organizations lead to the “facilitation of
41
cooperation in the carrying out of large-scale tasks.” And according
to Kenneth Arrow, information scattered over a large organization
must be both filtered and transmitted to a centralized authority in
order for a large organization to make informed decisions and
42
minimize error in decision making. The American Bar Association’s
Committee on Corporate Laws also noted the benefits of centralized
authority, stating, “the deployment of diverse investors’ capital by
centralized management maximizes corporate America’s ability to

or of loyalty or acted in bad faith. If that is shown, the burden then shifts to the
director defendants to demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction was
entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (quoting Aronson, 473
A.2d at 812). According to Henry G. Manne, the business judgment rule “will preclude the
courts from any consideration of honest if inept business decisions, and that seems to be the
purpose of the rule.” Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53
VA. L. REV. 259, 271 (1967).
39. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
40. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
41. See CLARK, supra note 30, app. at 801–16 (arguing that “facilitation of cooperation”
allows for efficiently completing large tasks).
42. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68–70 (1974). In his seminal
article on corporate law, Professor Michael Dooley was the first to make the connection
between the work of Kenneth Arrow and the structure of Delaware corporate law. Dooley,
supra note 1, at 467. For equally influential articles on the application of Arrow’s work to
corporate law, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88
IOWA L. REV. 1, 7 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule];
and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003). See also Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth
Maximization and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389 (2014)
[hereinafter Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization]; Bernard S. Sharfman, Why Proxy
Access is Harmful to Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 387 (2012) [hereinafter Sharfman,
Why Proxy Access is Harmful].
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43

contribute to long-term wealth creation.” In sum, corporate law’s
approach is to enhance corporate decision making and maximize
44
by being extremely deferential to board
shareholder wealth
decision-making authority.
The value of centralized authority is especially critical to widely
held public companies. Michael Dooley observed that the value of
centralized authority in an organization is magnified as the
45
knowledge and interests of its members diverge. In a public
company, information and interests differ between management and
46
shareholders. Especially where there are a large number of
shareholders, it is much more efficient, in terms of maximizing
shareholder value, for the board of directors and executive
management—the corporate actors that possess overwhelming
advantages in terms of information, including nonpublic
information, and whose skills in the management of the company are
honed by specialization in the management of this one company—to
47
make corporate decisions rather than shareholders. Moreover, as
we subsequently discuss in Part II, most shareholders, including
value traders, have no interest in managing the company, even if they
have acquired a significant amount of information about the
company.
In general, we believe that the explanation behind why public
companies take the corporate form is consistent with the
43. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Preserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder
Interventions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER & ACTIVISM 4
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2298415
(citing COMM. ON CORP. LAWS OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF BUS. LAW, REPORT ON
THE ROLES OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS OF PUBLICLY OWNED
CORPORATIONS (2009), available at
http://www.hunton.com/media/SEC_Proxy
/PDF/SEC_Agenda_Section2.PDF).
44. For purposes of this Article, we assume that shareholder wealth maximization is the
corporate objective both in terms of corporate governance and corporate law. See Shareholder
Wealth Maximization, supra note 42, for a discussion of shareholder wealth maximization as
the objective of both corporate governance and corporate law.
45. Dooley, supra note 1, at 467 (“Where the residual claimants are not expected to run
the firm and especially when they are many in number (thus increasing disparities in
information and interests), their function becomes specialized to risk-bearing, thereby creating
both the opportunity and necessity for managerial specialists.”).
46. See id. at 466–67. The value of centralized authority is not as great in general
partnerships and closely-held corporations because the same persons perform both the
managerial and risk-taking (investment) functions. See id. at 466. Management and partners or
shareholders are essentially one and the same. See id.
47. See id.
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contractarian explanation, that the default rules provided by
48
corporate law are, for the most part, “market mimicking.” This is
especially true for rules that govern the relationship between the
board and shareholders. We say this because, as we have already
discussed, we believe corporate law correctly provides authority to
the board and its executive officers, and therefore it is doubtful that
private ordering that significantly shifts decision making to
49
shareholders will enhance the efficiency of this relationship.
50
But even in the context of the largest corporations, corporate
law’s great deference toward board authority is not absolute and was
48. This phrase was coined by Professor Bernard Black. See Bernard S. Black, Is
Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 552
(1990).
49. However, we concede that because of transaction costs that exist in the real world,
the extensive use of corporate law’s default rules by public companies is not entirely the result
of these rules being contractually efficient. In that regard, we are sympathetic to the argument
made by Michael Klausner, who persuasively argues that the uniformity and stickiness in
corporate governance arrangements at public companies is due to significant transaction costs
and not the result of efficient private ordering in a theoretically cost-free environment. Michael
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779,
791–93 (2006) [hereinafter Klausner, The Contractarian Theory]; see also Michael Klausner,
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 826–29 (1995).
Klausner provides the following, non-market mimicking explanation for the prevalent use of
corporate law’s default rules in corporate charters:
There is inherent uncertainty regarding how courts will apply and interpret any but
the most simple legal rules, contract terms, or charter terms. This uncertainty is a
cost of legal enforcement. As a legal rule or charter term is interpreted and applied
in a variety of settings, however, the term acquires more content, and uncertainty
regarding its application declines. As a result, enforcement costs decline.
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory, supra at 793 (citing Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”),
83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719–25, 731–33 (1997)). The result is that the corporate charter is a
relatively simplistic and abbreviated document that by its silence incorporates the default rules
of corporate law. See id. at 789–90. For example, Klausner discusses empirical evidence that
describes how the governance arrangements of companies filing for initial public offerings are
remarkably uniform. See id. at 790–91; see also Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate
Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1336–37 (2013). The only significant variability
occurs in how much protection should be given a board from the threat of a hostile takeover.
See Klausner, The Contractarian Theory, supra at 790.
50. Why a corporation would decide to produce what it needs internally, and thereby
grow to great size, instead of contracting for all its needs in the relevant market, is a function
of transaction costs and the marginal analysis that goes into determining the better alternative.
See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393−97 (1937). Such a
need for large size arises in this because “managers continuously compare the incremental costs
and payoffs of internal production (expansion or vertical integration) against external
procurement, chosing [sic] whichever alternative provides the best payoff until the two are
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never meant to be. Corporate law recognizes that a certain amount
of accountability, even if infrequently and lightly applied, is required
to control for error in corporate decision making as it relates to a
board’s cognitive and behavioral limitations in the context of small51
group decision making, as well as the more widely discussed
opportunistic (self-interested) behavior by directors and executive
management when there is a wide separation of authority between
52
share ownership and management. Such opportunistic behavior
includes corporate management shirking its duties or trying to
53
extract private benefits from the corporation. These types of
54
behavior lead to agency costs in public companies.
Given this preference for centralized authority, it is not
unexpected that corporate law has created significant roadblocks for
shareholder activists to overcome. However, these roadblocks are not

equalized at the margin.” Herbert Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets, 31 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 63,
68 (2011). The point of optimal firm size, which means the corporation may become very
large in size, is a function of this marginal analysis. See id. at 71.
51. Arrow discussed this in terms of the centralized authority (the small group in charge
of decision making such as a board of directors) becoming a victim of information overload.
ARROW, supra note 42, at 74. The problem of information overload is compounded “by the
tendency in that situation to filter information in accordance with one’s preconceptions.” Id. at
75. Another issue is group polarization, the tendency of a small deliberative group with an
initial tendency to move in a given direction to move to even more extreme positions in that
direction following group deliberations. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments:
Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1004
(2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups 20 (Univ. of
Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 401, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121400; see also Bernard S. Sharfman
& Steven J. Toll, Dysfunctional Deference and Board Composition: Lessons from Enron, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 153, 155 (2008).
52. See Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 42, at 107.
53. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 465.
54. See Rose, supra note 9, at 1361 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976)). As explained by Professor Rose:
Under a classic theory of the firm, agency costs in the corporate context increase as
ownership is separated from control. As the manager’s ownership of shares in the
firm decreases as a percentage of the total, the manager will bear a diminishing
fraction of the costs of any nonpecuniary benefits he takes out in maximizing his
own utility. To prevent the manager from maximizing his utility at the expense of
the shareholders, shareholders will seek to constrain the manager’s behavior by
aligning the manager’s interests with the shareholders’ interests.
Id. at 1361 (citations omitted).
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insurmountable. Shareholder activists still have the right to advocate
for a voice in operational decision making not only through
engagement with executive management, but also through the threat
55
of a proxy contest, binding by-law proposals, or non-binding
shareholder proposals if such changes are not implemented.
Shareholders may also legally challenge board decisions on both a
derivative and direct basis, seeking either to enjoin the board
decision or to obtain an award of damages for decisions already
made. Finally, shareholders also have the right to inspect a
56
corporation’s books and records for a proper purpose.
However, an increase in accountability brought about by
shareholder activism does not necessarily result in enhanced
corporate decision making. The risk is that in the process of trying to
correct or prevent errors resulting from poor managerial decisions,
57
“the genuine values of authority” will be destroyed. Such “a
sufficiently strict and continuous organ of responsibility can easily
58
amount to a denial of authority.” Arrow suggests, “if every decision
of A is to be reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the
locus of authority from A to B and hence no solution to the original
59
problem.” For example, allowing every major board decision to be
reviewed and voted on by shareholders inhibits the ability of
corporate managers to make the most efficient and wealthmaximizing decisions on a timely basis. This implies that “[i]n such a
scenario, accountability can be understood to cross over the line to
where a new and competing locus of authority is created—a locus of
authority, such as uninformed shareholders, that does not benefit
60
from the informational advantages of the original authority.” Thus,
in order to make sure that corporate decision making is allowed to
maximize the value of centralized authority, thereby getting as close
to shareholder wealth maximization as possible, shareholders must
accept a certain amount of group decision-making error and agency

55. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2011).
56. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1, 3–4 (Del. 1993)
(discussing the statutory right of stockholders under Delaware General Corporation Law
Section 220(b) to inspect the company books if they have a proper purpose and how public
policy may allow inspection even if it is adverse to the corporation’s interests).
57. ARROW, supra note 42, at 78.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 42, at 406.
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costs as a part of this decision-making process.
The central problem in the market for corporate influence is
identifying when the costs of protecting board authority become large
enough that corrective action by shareholders—beyond merely
waiting until the next director election—is justified. Arrow, the
intellectual godfather of the traditional authority model of corporate
law and governance, suggested that from time to time it may be more
efficient to allow for a corrective mechanism to exist in a large
organization. That is, the central authority recognizes that a part of
the organization outside itself may have superior information or
61
decision-making skills. From this we can infer that a shift in decisionmaking authority from the board to a company’s shareholders may
possibly be more efficient and enhance shareholder wealth in certain
discrete situations. However, consistent with a legal framework in
which fiduciary responsibility rests with the board and, to some
extent, controlling shareholders, in practice, authority does not shift to
62
unaccountable shareholders, but is at least temporarily shared.
Governance entrepreneurs in the market for corporate influence
must first identify those instances in which authority-sharing may
result in value-enhancing policy decisions, and then persuade the
board and/or other shareholders of the wisdom of their policies so
that they will be permitted to share the authority necessary to
implement the policies. The following Part discusses how and why
some shareholder activists are successful in identifying these
opportunities to influence.
II. DIFFERENTIATING SHAREHOLDERS
The type and quality of shareholder activism is a function of the
type of shareholder that is involved. To see why this is so, we must
first understand that shareholders in a public company can differ not
only in terms of how much information and skill they possess
relevant to corporate decision making, but also in their interest in
being involved in such decision making.
A public company’s stockholders can be differentiated based on
the roles they play in the equity markets. These groups include

61. ARROW, supra note 42, at 74–75.
62. Because they only have influence and not control, governance entrepreneurs such as
offensive activists rely on some degree of board and managerial cooperation in order to
facilitate their desired changes.
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insiders, liquidity traders, noise traders, market makers, and
63
information traders.
Insiders are stockholders, including directors and executive
management, who have access to nonpublic information about the
firm, but have significant restrictions in the trading of that
64
information for profit. Insiders, of course, do not participate in
65
shareholder activism.
Liquidity traders do not collect and evaluate information; rather,
66
they participate in the market depending on their funding needs.
67
Liquidity traders are typically passive, index fund investors; thus,
combined with the benefits of limited liability, such index fund
investors “utilize portfolio diversification to eliminate the
68
unsystematic risk associated with their equity investment.” These
traders generally have little or no information about any of the
companies they hold in their portfolio, no identified skills in decision
making, and no interest in the particular corporate decision making
69
of the hundreds or thousands of companies they invest in. This
group of investors is the stereotype for those who believe
70
shareholders are “rationally apathetic.” Therefore, the disparities
between management and shareholders are maximized with respect
to liquidity traders. Thus, because they have no information or
interest in participating in corporate decision making, their
participation in corporate decision making is likely to be weakly
informed or perhaps driven by opportunistic behavior.
Noise traders are, in the context of informationally efficient

63. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 722 (2006). This approach focuses on shareholders as having
different functions in the equity markets versus having heterogeneous interests in the holding
of company stock and the effects on corporate governance. See id. at 722–26. For the latter
approach, see Rose, supra note 9.
64. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 722.
65. As a reminder, shareholder activism only takes place in the market for corporate
influence, not in the market for corporate control. See supra notes 1–4 and text accompanying
notes.
66. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 724.
67. Id.
68. Bernard S. Sharfman, What’s Wrong with Shareholder Empowerment?, 37 J. CORP. L.
903, 906 (2012).
69. See id.
70. Id.
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markets, irrational investors. They utilize diverse investment
71
strategies. Some noise traders may invest based on fads and rumors,
while others may rely on old information or are simply slower in
72
analyzing information that is publicly available. Like liquidity
traders, when they participate in shareholder activism or corporate
voting, their participation is most likely to be weakly informed or
perhaps driven by opportunistic behavior.
Market makers are professionals who facilitate trading and
maintain a market for securities by offering to buy or sell securities
73
on a regular basis. Although market makers are well informed
about the demand and supply of a security, they may not be well
74
informed regarding firm-specific information. Again, like liquidity
traders and noise traders, when they participate in shareholder
activism or corporate voting, market makers are most likely to be
weakly informed or perhaps driven by opportunistic behavior.
Information traders are those market participants who trade in
the financial markets based on their own research or on
75
recommendations from others. These traders “are willing and able
to devote resources to gathering and analyzing information as a basis
76
Information traders include
for their investment decisions.”
sophisticated professional investors such as activist hedge fund
77
managers, money managers, and other market professionals.
Information traders look for differences between value and price
based on the information they possess and “then trade to capture the
78
value of their informational advantage.” Information traders move
security prices toward their fundamental values and are in essence
79
“the agents who render markets efficient.”
The value of information traders in the pricing of securities was

71. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 724.
72. See id. at 724–25.
73. See id. at 725.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 723. Professors Goshen and Parchomovsky also include as information
traders researchers and analysts who provide recommendations and advice. However, because
we are describing investors in the context of shareholder activism, we will not include these
market participants in our definition of information trader. See id. at 721.
76. Id. at 723
77. See id.
78. Id. at 726.
79. Id. at 719.
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first pointed out by Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz. They
noted that it is not possible for securities markets to operate without
market participants investing in information and earning positive
returns for their efforts. They argued that “because information is
costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the information which is
available, since if it did, those who spent resources to obtain it would
81
receive no compensation.” Instead, they argue, that what exists in
capital markets “is an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium: prices
reflect the information of informed individuals (arbitrageurs) but
only partially, so that those who expend resources to obtain
82
information do receive compensation.”
The insights provided by Grossman and Stiglitz mean that we
should understand the pricing of any individual stock more in terms
83
of having varying degrees of effectiveness, not efficiency. The
efficient market hypothesis “states that in free and actively traded
markets, stock prices will fully reflect all available information about
84
the corporation.” However, this mechanistic understanding of
markets implies that the seeking out of new information is futile.
Instead, under Grossman and Stiglitz’s understanding of capital
markets, information traders can now be understood to be financially
rewarded for helping to make the market more efficient when
seeking out new information on specific companies, without ever
85
achieving a perfect equilibrium. They thereby help to expand the
amount of data that can be utilized to value the stock of publicly
86
traded companies, using their analytical skills to create a competing
source of pricing information on the value of a public company’s
stock, or, as argued in this Article, to create a sharing of authority

80. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
81. Id. at 405.
82. Id. at 393.
83. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 730–31.
84. Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance
Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 437–38 (1984).
85. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 730–31.
86. For example, this has been helpful amidst the recent epidemic of Chinese companies
that have utilized reverse mergers to trade on U.S. stock exchanges with inflated reported
revenues and profits. See Sharfman, Why Proxy Access is Harmful, supra note 42, at 404–05.
These misrepresentations would not have come to light without the costly information
gathering of information traders, including the hiring of investigators to go out into the field
and visit the operations of the targeted Chinese firms, into the activities of these companies. Id.
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with the board of directors for certain discrete corporate decisions.
All such activities make the market more efficient by moving the
87
price of the stock toward its fundamental value.
However, even information traders may be rationally apathetic or
reticent when it comes to becoming involved in corporate decision
88
making. This is because, for the large majority of information
traders, there are still large disparities in valuable, non-public
information, skill in decision making, and interest in corporate
89
governance between them and corporate management. Instead,
90
these “value investors” specialize in utilizing the information they
have gathered to identify differences between value and price and
then trade the targeted stock to capture the value of this
91
informational advantage. Whatever limited time, resources, and
skill they have to devote to their work are targeted toward valuation,
not corporate governance.
Some information traders, including some hedge fund managers,
are exceptions to this rule. These traders “take large positions in
92
They are
public companies as a means to effect change.”
distinguished from value investors by their willingness to spend
resources to identify operational, strategic, or personnel changes that
they believe will enhance shareholder value and then spend even
more resources to try to get the corporation to implement those
93
changes. As detailed in the next Part, these traders are participating
94
in what is called offensive shareholder activism.

87. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 730–31.
88. See Sharfman, supra note 68, at 906–07.
89. See id.
90. Gilson and Gordon refer to institutional investors who are value investors (earn
returns based on fundamental analysis and diversification) and liquidity traders (earn returns
through low cost diversification) as “rationally reticent.” Gilson & Gordon, supra note 12, at
867. They vote, but they do not propose or get involved in trying to influence the
management of the corporation. See id. According to Gilson and Gordon, “[i]nstitutional
owners who are not seeking private benefits of control are rationally reticent; they also will
assign a low value to governance rights since their proactive exercise will not improve the
relative performance on which the institutional investor’s profitability and ability to attract
assets depends.” Id. at 895 (footnote omitted).
91. Sharfman, supra note 68, at 907.
92. Id.
93. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 4, at 56–57.
94. Id.
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III. OFFENSIVE SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Offensive shareholder activism, as identified by John Armour and
95
Brian Cheffins, is performance-driven activism initiated primarily
96
by a specific type of institutional investor: the hedge fund. It
97
typically begins with a hedge fund accumulating a significant
98
amount of a company’s stock. The catalyst for the accumulation is
a determination by the hedge fund that the target company is
currently not maximizing returns, but that if management would
implement the hedge fund’s recommended changes, company
performance would improve, the stock would increase in value, and
99
the hedge fund would reap excess returns.
This activism is distinct from “defensive shareholder activism,”
which refers to institutional investors that hold significant blocks of
company stock and advocate for changes only when company
100
fortunes decline.
95. Id. Since these companies are rarely interested in gaining corporate control,
Professors Cheffins and Armour refer to these activities in sum as the “market for corporate
influence.” Id. at 58–59.
96. Id. at 53.
97. There is no consensus definition of “hedge fund.” However, for purposes of this
Article we will identify these institutional investors by the following four characteristics as
provided by Professors Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas:
(1) they are pooled, privately organized investment vehicles; (2) they are
administered by professional investment managers with performance-based
compensation and significant investments in the fund; (3) they are not widely
available to the public; and (4) they operate outside of securities regulation and
registration requirements. More specifically, hedge funds avoid the Investment
Company Act of 1940 by having a relatively small number of sophisticated investors.
Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J.
FIN. 1729, 1735 (2008) (citation omitted).
98. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 4, at 56. Cheffins & Armour have identified
instances of offensive shareholder activism going back to at least the first decade of the
twentieth century. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, Offensive Shareholder Activism in
U.S. Public Companies, 1900–49, 5–6 (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No.
09/2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759983.
99. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 4, at 56.
100. Id. As explained by Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock:
Mutual fund and public pension fund activism, if it occurs, tends to be incidental
and ex post: when fund management notes that portfolio companies are
underperforming, or that their governance regime is deficient, they will sometimes
be active. In contrast, hedge fund activism is strategic and ex ante: hedge fund
managers first determine whether a company would benefit from activism, then take
a position and become active.
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According to Cheffins and Armour:
The readiness to take a hands-on role to shake things up is
the crucial additional dimension to hedge fund activism.
Activist hedge funds, rather than merely adopting the
passive approach that characterizes value investing and
waiting for the market to self-correct—which may well
never happen if a company’s shares do not get noticed and
instead drift lower—are prepared to take the initiative and
accelerate matters by lobbying for changes calculated to
101
boost shareholder returns.

Therefore, offensive shareholder activists are proactive while
102
defensive shareholder activists are reactive. Moreover, relative to
the typical information trader who is only value-investing and not
participating in shareholder activism, offensive shareholder activists
provide additional information to the corporation and the
marketplace in the form of recommended changes to corporate
strategy.
The following is an example of offensive shareholder activism. In
early 2012, Relational Investors LLC (Relational) began
accumulating shares of the Timken Co. (NYSE: TKR). By June 30,
103
2012, it had acquired approximately $65 million of Timken stock,
and by September 30, 2012, it had increased its holdings to
104
On August 23, 2012, Relational
approximately $120 million.
made its first reported presentation to the company’s board, urging
the board to split the company into two, with one part focusing on
105
steel production and the other on ball bearings. This proposal was
106
met with strong opposition from the board.

Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1069 (2007) (footnote omitted).
101. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 4, at 58 (footnotes omitted).
102. See id. at 56.
103. See Relational Investors LLC, Quarterly Report (Form 13F-HR/A) (June 30,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1047644/ 00010474691
2010843/a2211829z13f-hra.txt.
104. See Relational Investors LLC, Quarterly Report (Form 13F) (Sept. 30, 2012),
available
at
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1047644/000104746912010845/
0001047469-12-010845.txt.
105. See Timken Co., Exhibit B (Form SC 13D/A) (Feb. 19, 2013), available at
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000110465913011766/a13-5429_1ex99db.htm.
106. See id.
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As a result, California State Teachers’ Retirement System
(CalSTRS), with approval from Relational, placed a non-binding
resolution in the company’s annual meeting proxy materials that
107
This proposal was approved by a 53%
called for such a split.
majority of Timken shareholders at the annual shareholders meeting
108
held May 7, 2013. As a result, the Timken board announced on
June 10, 2013 that it had formed a Strategy Committee made up of
109
independent directors to evaluate such a separation of businesses.
In addition, as reported on August 2, 2013, Relational increased its
110
stake in Timken to 7.9%.
On September 5, 2013, the board of Timken “approved a plan
to separate the Company’s steel business from its bearings and power
111
Of most interest to
transmission business through a spinoff.”
Timken stockholders, the price of Timken stock responded by rising
112
2.9% to $62.02, the highest price since at least January 4, 1978.
On June 30, 2014, Timken distributed 100% of its interest in its
113
steel operations to the holders of the company’s common stock.
The Timken example illustrates how offensive shareholder
activists can reap handsome rewards for themselves and for the
company as a whole by successfully advocating for internal changes
within the corporation that take advantage of unrealized value which
only they, and not the board of directors, were able to perceive. We

107. See Timken Co., Schedule 14A (Form SC 14A) (Mar. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000119312513118303/d494162ddef14
a.htm.
108. Timken Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 8, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000119312513207498/d534241d8k.htm.
109. The Timken Company Establishes Board Strategy Committee to Evaluate Separation of
Steel Business, PR NEWSWIRE (June 10, 2013, 4:05 PM), http://news.timken.com/
index.php?s=12504&item=136827.
110. See Timken Co., Schedule 13D (Form SC 13D/A) (Aug. 2, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000110465913059738/a1317712_1sc13da.htm.
111. Timken Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (September 5, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000119312513361485/d595784d8k.htm.
112. Leslie Picker & Thomas Black, Timken Jumps After Agreeing to Spin Off Steel Unit,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2013, 4:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0906/timken-jumps-after-agreeing-to-spin-off-steel-unit.html.
113. See Timken Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 30, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98362/000009836214000094/a8kforsteelspinof
.htm.
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next turn to a theoretical explanation of offensive shareholder
activism.
A. Offensive Shareholder Activism as a Sharing of Authority
According to Arrow, “[t]he basic deficiency of irresponsible
authority from the functional view point is the likelihood of
114
unnecessary error.” Moreover, “[e]rror is unnecessary when the
information is available somewhere in the organization but not
115
available to or not used by the authority.” According to Arrow,
“others in the organization may have access to superior information
116
on at least some matters.” Therefore, it is legitimate to criticize
such authority, allowing for a “corrective mechanism” when
117
necessary.
As noted earlier, it follows that a shift in decision-making
authority or, more accurately, a sharing of authority between the
board and a shareholder or small group of shareholders may be more
118
For those who seek
efficient in certain discrete situations.
enhanced corporate decisions through shareholder activism, the issue
becomes identifying those situations in which it is more efficient to
share decision making with shareholders.
Offensive shareholder activism often serves as a corrective
mechanism and thus results in a legitimate sharing of authority on a
discrete basis. The traditional understanding of shareholder activism
is that it is a tool of accountability used to minimize agency costs.
For example, activism may reduce agency costs that result from
119
management shirking or rent seeking, or from an inability by the
board to breach implicit agreements that the corporation has
maintained for a long period of time but have, for whatever reason,

114. ARROW, supra note 42, at 73–74.
115. Id. at 74.
116. Id. at 75.
117. Id.
118. See Sharfman, supra note 68, at 905.
119. According to Professors Matsusaka and Ozbas, “[f]acing an active shareholder who
seeks to maximize profit, a manager suffering from an agency problem may compromise by
choosing an action that is closer to profit maximization than would otherwise have been
chosen.” John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas, Managerial Accommodation, Proxy Access,
and the Cost of Shareholder Empowerment 3–4 (Marshall Sch. of Bus. Working Paper No. FBE
02-12, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984606.
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120

outlived their usefulness. Alternatively, the cause for activism could
be a lack of good decision-making ability on the part of the board
and executive management as a group or in their respective
121
Whatever the cause, the real thrust of offensive
capacities.
shareholder activism is to challenge board decision making when it is
not maximizing shareholder wealth. Very simply, the offensive
shareholder activist thinks it has a superior approach to enhancing
shareholder wealth. Additionally, while insiders have informational
advantages over offensive activists regarding firm-specific
information, offensive activists may possess, on a discrete basis,
decision-making skills, superior information about competitors, or
other important decision-making inputs that erode or even eclipse
the overall informational advantages of the board and managers.
B. The Small Problem of Uninformed Shareholders
The glitch in offensive shareholder activism is that if the challenge
to board authority ultimately leads to a proxy vote, then shareholders
as a body must decide how to proceed. In this scenario, the two
competing loci of authority with the most specialized expertise and
information to make corporate decisions, the board and the offensive
shareholder activist, are relegated to the sidelines as pitchmen for their
respective positions during the shareholder vote. Given that a
significant percentage of a company’s shareholders may be noninformation traders, this may lead to sub-optimal decision making.
Fortunately, the problem of uninformed shareholders as the
ultimate arbiters of whether or not offensive shareholder activism is
wealth enhancing is mitigated by the fact that there has been
relatively few proxy votes resulting from such activism. Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy, and Thomas report that only 13% of hedge fund activism
(as represented primarily by a hedge fund’s filing of an SEC form
Schedule 13D) resulted in a proxy contest, while Klein and Zur
reported that only 12% of offensive shareholder activism initiated by
122
It
hedge funds and other activists resulted in a proxy contest.
120. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 42, at 417 n.151 (citing
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988)).
121. See ARROW, supra note 42, at 74.
122. Brav et al., supra note 97, at 1743; April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial
Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 213, 215
(2009).
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appears then that the mere threat of a proxy contest is often enough
to get the board to seriously consider the recommendations of the
offensive shareholder activist and implement those recommendations
in a significant number of instances. Thus, the problem of allowing
uninformed shareholders to participate in the decision-making
process can be avoided in the overwhelming number of instances
where offensive shareholder activism has been implemented.
C. Empirical Analysis of Offensive Shareholder Activism
In an Arrowian approach to corporate governance, the key
question is why should corporate board authority ever yield to
shareholder accountability? In other words, under what
circumstances should the board permit shareholders to influence
corporate policy?
If we use as our metrics the creation of shareholder value and
improved firm performance, the available empirical evidence suggests
that board members should be cautious in how they allow
shareholders to influence corporate strategy. In terms of
performance-related activism, only offensive shareholder activism has
123
been found to actually enhance shareholder wealth. Furthermore,
123. The empirical work of Boyson and Mooradian has led them to conclude that
“aggressive activism [defined as “activism having a specific motive other than ‘communication’
or ‘investment purposes only’”] and activism targeting changes in corporate governance
[board representation and enhanced cash flow] are strongly related to improvement in longterm performance and improvement in cash positions . . . .” Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M.
Mooradian, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14 REV. DERIVATIVES RES. 169,
178, 201 (2011);
Activism [hedge fund] that targets the sale of the company or changes in business
strategy, such as refocusing and spinning-off noncore assets, is associated with the
largest positive abnormal partial effects . . . . In contrast, we find that the market
response to capital structure-related activism—including debt restructuring,
recapitalization, dividends, and share repurchases—is positive yet insignificant. We
find a similar lack of statistically meaningful reaction for governance-related
activism—including attempts to rescind takeover defenses, to oust CEOs, to
enhance board independence, and to curtail CEO compensation.
Brav et al., supra note 97, at 1731. See also Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or
Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 323, 324 (2008) (finding
that firms targeted by hedge funds for active purposes earn larger, positive returns than firms
targeted by hedge funds for passive purpose; this control group contained hedge funds that
filed Schedule 13Gs); Robin M. Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and
Takeovers, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 362, 368–70 (2009) (finding that activists are most successful at
creating value when they are able to force a change in control); Klein & Zur, supra note 122 at
217 (focusing on activist campaigns by both hedge funds and other types of entrepreneurial
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significant wealth enhancement has been found only where the
activism has led to “the sale of the company or changes in business
124
strategy, such as refocusing and spinning-off noncore assets.” An
example of this would be Relational’s recommendation that Timken
Co. spin off its steel operations into a separate public company in
order to increase the price of the company’s stock. Recent research
suggests we can delve even further and find that while both
experienced and inexperienced offensive shareholder activsts create
significant wealth and performance enhancement within a corporation,
125
experienced activists do better than inexperienced activists.
In empirical research, offensive shareholder activists are usually
identified by their filing of the SEC form Schedule 13D. Such a
filing is required when an investor crosses over the 5% threshold of
stock ownership and has at least some intention to influence the
126
The filing
corporation either immediately or in the future.
requirement applies not only to hedge funds, but also to all other
types of entrepreneurial activist investors (private equity firms,
venture capitalists, asset management groups, and private
127
individuals). An investor files the shorter Schedule 13G if it only
intends to invest passively and not influence corporate decision
128
making.
Based on our prior discussion, the pricing of shares in the
presence of offensive shareholder activism can be explained as
follows: at the time the offensive shareholder activist reveals that it

activists, the study found that both types of campaigns produced average abnormal returns for
target shareholders).
124. Brav et al., supra note 97, at 1731. See also Greenwood & Schor, supra note 123, at
363 (finding that abnormal positive returns only existed when the activism was associated with
the ultimate sale of the target to a third party).
125. Nicole M. Boyson, Linlin Ma & Robert Mooradian, Are All Hedge Fund Activists
Created Equal? The Impact of Experience on Hedge Fund Activism 1 (March 21, 2014) (on file
with authors) (“[O]ur results imply that more experienced activists deliver better short-term
performance and long-term outcomes for target firms.”). Interestingly, they find that “relative
to less frequent activists, more frequent activists choose larger firms with less cash, better stock
and operating performance, and a larger distance to default.” Id. at 3.
126. See Schedule 13D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm.
127. See id. April Klein and Emanuel Zur appropriately point out that offensive
shareholder activism is not the sole province of hedge funds, but can also include any other
type of private individual or entity who takes a significant stake in a company and then
advocates for corporate change. See Klein & Zur, supra note 122, at 187.
128. See SEC Rule on Filing of Schedules 13D and 13G, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2011).
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has made a significant investment in the company, the stock market
does not know if the proposed changes are expected to be superior,
equal, or inferior to what the board and management is expected to
implement. All the market knows, at least at the time the hedge fund
files its Schedule 13D, is that an information trader has made a
significant investment in a particular company and expects excess
returns if its recommended changes are implemented. Many
investors who actively trade in the stock market will no doubt try to
free ride on this investor’s research, analysis, and recommendations
and will invest in the company stock without having to expend
resources in such work. This new demand among free-riding
investors allows the stock to have at least a short-term run-up in
market price, regardless of whether the hedge fund is right or wrong
129
in its approach to enhancing corporate performance.
If so, empirical studies on offensive shareholder activism, usually
in the form of event studies, may simply be reporting on this shortterm run-up in the prices of the targeted stocks. The abnormal
returns may soon disappear once information traders have had time
to properly evaluate the recommendations for the postive (or
negative) value they may provide and then estimate the probability
that these recommendations will actually be implemented.
However, it has not been the case that these abnormal positive
returns have disappeared over time. Studies by Boyson and
130
131
and Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas
have
Mooradian
demonstrated that the short-term run-up in stock prices from hedge
fund activism persists for at least a year after the filing of a Schedule
13D. Perhaps most importantly, a recent study by Bebchuk, Brav,
and Jiang has shown that hedge fund activism does not result in
132
abnormal negative returns over a five-year period. This indicates

129. Based on the ability of offensive shareholder activists to earn consistent returns, it
should not be surprising that a general herding effect has been observed where institutional
investors, such as mutual funds, follow after the trading patterns of hedge funds. See Yawen
Jiao & Pengfei Ye, Mutual Fund Herding in Response to Hedge Fund Herding and the Impacts
on Stock Prices J. BANKING & FIN. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://faculty.ucr.edu/~yawenj/mfhf.pdf. Moreover, Jiao and Ye observed that “[m]utual
funds’ following of hedge funds leads to a significant price impact in the same quarter and
more importantly, a sharp price reversal in the next quarter, whereas hedge fund herding itself
does not destabilize prices.” Id. at 35.
130. Boyson, Ma & Mooradian, supra note 125.
131. Brav et al., supra note 97.
132. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
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that the information provided to the marketplace and corporations
by offensive shareholder activism is generally perceived to be valuable
to shareholders and is being integrated into corporate strategy in a
statistically significant way.
On a macro level, empirical studies have shown that at least
certain types of offensive shareholder activism are beneficial for
133
However, the results of empirical studies must be
shareholders.
interpreted carefully so as not to overstate their informational value.
Empirical research does not suggest that every time a hedge fund
takes a substantial position in a company and then recommends
changes that correspond to postive abnormal returns in empirical
134
studies, those changes are correct for that particular company. The
reason for this can be found in the limitations associated with
empirical analysis. For example, an event study focusing on the filing
of a Schedule 13D, the type of study generally used to evaluate the
value of hedge fund activity, requires a large sample size of
companies because of the individual volatility of an individual
135
That is, the statistical power where the
company’s stock price.
136
sample size is one is “likely to be quite low.” One reason for this is
that the variability of returns for a sample size of one is much greater

Activism (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper No. 13-66, 2013), available at http://papers.s
srn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577. For empirical results consistent with these
studies but focusing on hedge fund activity outside the United States, see Dionysia
Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 459, 479 (2013) (“Of the 379 investments for which a holding period could be
determined, 100 (26.4%) were for less than one year (short-term), 131 (34.6%) were for
between one and three years (medium term), and 148 (39.1%) were for more than three years
(long term).”).
133. See Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Experienced Hedge Fund Activists
(AFA Chi. Meetings Paper, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1787649 (finding
that hedge fund activism by “experienced” managers significantly contributes to hedge fund
profitability, justifying an investment in the pursuit of activism).
134. For example, after a three-year attempt to turnaround J.C. Penney, Pershing Square
Capital Management finally gave up and sold its 39.1 million shares in the company for a loss
of approximately $473 million. Mr. William Ackman, the manager of Pershing Square, thought
he could turn around J.C. Penney with new management. However, his new management
team was not successful in improving operating results or increasing the stock price by the time
of Pershing Square’s disinvestment. See Michael J. de la Merced, His Links Severed, Ackman
(Aug. 26, 2013, 5:22
PM),
Sells
Stake
in
J.C.
Penney,
DEALBOOK
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/ackman-moves-to-sell-stake-in-j-c-penney/.
135. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law,
HANDBOOK L. & ECON. 1, 12 (2005).
136. Id.
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than even a sample size of just a couple of stocks. Also, where the
sample size is one, it is hard to separate out the significance of other
138
events on the stock price. Moreover, empirical studies have to be
periodically replicated not just to test the validity of the results, but
because the data changes over time, and therefore the statistical
139
relationships change as well.
Thus, one interpretation of the results of empirical studies is that
they may support the argument that certain types of offensive
shareholder activism have value, but they do not provide conclusive
proof that offensive shareholder activism has value at any specific
140
Instead, the use of empirical
company at any specific time.
evidence supporting offensive shareholder activism should be
understood as merely supporting the notion that offensive
shareholder activists should be permitted to rebut the general
presumption of superiority of existing managerial strategies. This
understanding provides the board with the option of implementing
the recommendations, in whole or in part, or explaining to the
company’s shareholders why some or all of the recommendations
would not add value as a means to pre-empt a possible proxy
contest.
Alternatively, when empirical analysis does not support a certain
type of performance-driven activism, such as defensive shareholder
activism or offensive shareholder activism that focuses on debt
restructuring, the activist bears a commensurately higher burden in
overcoming the general presumption in favor of the board’s own
strategies and policies.

137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38–54
(2002).
140. Hedge fund activism even results in unknown “spillover” effects that reach beyond
the targeted firms. See, e.g., Nickolay Gantchev, Oleg Gredil & Chotibhak Jotikasthira,
Governance Under the Gun: Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism (March 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2356544.
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IV. SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM INVESTORS
In this Part, we attempt to address one of the primary criticisms
of offensive shareholder activism: that such activists promote “shorttermism” since they ignore what is best for the corporation in the
141
long-term. According to Bebchuk:
Short-termism refers to companies taking actions that are profitable
in the short term but value-decreasing in the long term, such as
increasing near-term earnings by cutting research that would pay
off later on. Activist investors with short investment horizons, it is
argued, seek actions that boost short-term stock price at the
expense of long-term value and often succeed in pressuring
142
companies to take such actions.

According to Martin Lipton, a leading corporate lawyer, such
short-termism is a specialty of activist hedge funds:
Institutional investors on average own more than 70% of the shares
of the major public companies. Their voting power is being
harnessed by a gaggle of activist hedge funds who troll through
SEC filings looking for opportunities to demand a change in a
company’s strategy or portfolio that will create a short-term profit
without regard to the impact on the company’s long-term
143
prospects.

Notwithstanding these concerns, a pejorative view of investors
who have short-term investment time horizons, especially hedge
fund activists, is mystifying on several counts. First, all shareholders,
whether they have a short- or long-term investment horizon, value
shares that have significant liquidity. That is, all shareholders want to
have the ability to sell their shares at a moment’s notice at the
maximum price possible. For example, a long-term investor such as a
pension fund may suddenly become a short-term investor or invest
in small amounts in order to meet the demands of its beneficiaries.
141. Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the
Economy, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013,
9:22 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-theapple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/.
142. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1638–39 (2013).
143. Lipton, supra note 141.
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Or short-term investors may decide to hold onto their stock for a
much longer period of time than originally anticipated and then sell
at a later date. A liquid market provides this sell/hold option. Thus,
the more liquidity a stock is perceived to have, the greater its value
to both types of investors, all else being equal.
Second, the process of valuing a company’s stock is the same for
investors no matter what their expected holding period. Both shortand long-term investors will estimate the company’s expected cash
flows out into the future and then utilize a discount rate to come up
with a present value. Both will use a long-term time horizon to do
this calculation, regardless of their expected holding period.
Therefore, both types of investors want the board of directors and
executive management to make the most efficient and shareholderwealth-enhancing decisions—whether it be short-term cost cutting
or investing in a long-term project—in order to maximize the
144
current value of the stock price.
If a hedge fund argues for short-term cost cutting at a company,
this means it expects this approach to maximize the value of the
company stock relative to other possible wealth-enhancing options.
Indeed, such a recommended approach may simply be an attempt to
shift the company to a lower risk level that is more in line with the
company’s potential returns. If so, then the stock price should rise.
Alternatively, a hedge fund could argue for more investment in basic
research if it thought that this would yield a higher stock market
price. Ultimately, offensive shareholder activists should be indifferent
to the types of recommendations they make as long as they believe
the recommendations will result in the highest possible stock price.
According to Kahan and Rock:
For the short-term trading horizon of hedge funds to generate a
short-term investment outlook for hedge fund managers, the stock
market must suffer from myopia: that is, it must undervalue long-

144. According to Black and Kraakman:
Under elementary principles of finance, even short-term investors have an incentive
to maximize the firm’s long-term value, because only by doing so can they
maximize the price at which long-term investors will buy the shares that short-term
investors will soon want to sell (the unity of long- and short-term shareholder
interests is known as Fisher separation).
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for
Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 532–33 (2002).
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term investments relative to short-term investments. If the market
does not itself suffer from such a bias, then the interests of
investors with short-term trading horizons will not conflict with
145
those of investors with long-term trading horizons.

Moreover, if the stock market thought hedge funds and other
private individuals engaged in offensive shareholder activism were
promoting recommendations that were heavily biased toward shortterm opportunities, to the exclusion of many profitable long-term
opportunities, then we would expect empirical studies to show such
activism to be wealth reducing in the short term, not wealth
enhancing. So far, the studies cited in Part III.C have shown this not
to be the case.
Third, this perception of offensive shareholder activists as only
caring about the short-term may simply be a result of their business
model, which requires them to have relatively short holding periods.
Think of offensive shareholder activists as specialists in identifying
significant impediments to maximizing shareholder wealth that are
not being addressed by the board of a targeted company. For
offensive shareholder activists to maximize their returns, they cannot
have long holding periods. This is because once they remove the
impediment to shareholder wealth maximization, they must move on
to the next corporation in order to maximize the number of
interventions and thus the profits of their own investors.
Alternatively, it is not possible for long-term investors like Warren
Buffet and Berkshire Hathaway to participate in that market precisely
because they have such long holding periods. Therefore, long-term
investors must yield that market to offensive shareholder activists
146
who complement and enhance the wealth of long-term investors.

145. Kahan & Rock, supra note 100, at 1084. See also George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential
Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 116–19,
122–28 (2010) (arguing that this alleged short-termism on the part of institutional investors,
including hedge funds, is of dubious validity and noting that such short-termism has not been
empirically verified).
146. An interesting example of how investors with different investment horizons
complement each other comes from the market for corporate control. In 2014, H.L. Heinz
was acquired by Berkshire Hathaway and 3G Capital, a Brazilian private equity firm, for $23
million in a fifty-fifty split. The day-to-day operations will be handled by 3G Capital, and in a
few years, after it has enhanced its operations, it is expected to sell its equity stake to Berkshire
Hathaway. See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT: THE ENDURING
VALUE OF VALUES 15–17 (Columbia Univ. Press 2014).
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Fourth, the studies cited in Part III.C have demonstrated that
the short-term run-up in stock prices from hedge fund activism
147
persists for at least a year after the filing of a Schedule 13D, and
the initial positive stock price performance of hedge fund activism is
148
Such results
not reversed over a subsequent five-year period.
confirm the benefits of offensive shareholder activism for the long149
term, not just the short-term.
A. The Intrinsic Value Argument
Notwithstanding the foregoing, critics of offensive shareholder
activism can make what can be referred to as the “intrinsic value” or
150
They may claim that the board, and
“hidden value” argument.
especially executive management, are specialists in the management
of the company and are the only ones privy to confidential
information on the performance and prospects of the company they
manage. Unfortunately, it is not empirically known how much
informational asymmetry exists between management and
151
shareholders at any firm at any point in time. It may be a little, it
may be a lot; the extent of the asymmetry is not known and may be
152
However, it is beyond doubt that information
unknowable.
153
and that shareholders, including offensive
asymmetries do exist
shareholder activists, are at an informational disadvantage relative to
directors. In sum, the board and executive management are in the

147. See Boyson & Mooradian, supra note 123; Brav et al., supra note 97; Klein & Zur,
supra note 122 (such abnormal positive returns also persist for a year when the investor is a
private individual or entity but not a hedge fund).
148. See Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 132.
149. See id.
150. Black and Kraakman list nine assumptions upon which the “hidden value” model of
valuation rests. Black & Kraakman, supra note 144, at 529–33. However, according to
Kihlstrom and Wachter, only five are actually required to support the notion of hidden value.
Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Policy and the Coherence of Delaware
Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 523, 533–34 (2003). These five assumptions are that (1)
the board has private information as to company value, (2) there are barriers to this
information being communicated to the market, (3) the valuation gap between valuations
based on the company’s private versus the market’s public information can be large, (4)
valuation gaps persist over a significant period of time, and (5) the market for corporate
control cannot eliminate the valuation gaps. See id. at 534 n.34.
151. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 696 (2010).
152. See id.
153. See id.
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best position to estimate the company’s intrinsic or fundamental
value, not the market or any of its participants.
If so, the critics’ argument follows, then the role of the board
and its executive management is not necessarily to maximize the
market share price, but to maximize the “intrinsic value” of the
154
But we must also assume that the board is
company’s shares.
dedicated to maximizing this value and that they have the proper
155
techniques for measuring intrinsic value.
What Lipton and others who argue against offensive shareholder
activism are suggesting when they refer to hedge fund activists
suffering from short-termism is that these investors are not privy to
the entire opportunity set of strategic options available to the
156
corporation that will enhance shareholder wealth. Moreover, even
regarding the options that are publicly known, the activists do not
have as much information as the board and executive management in
regard to their benefits and costs. Also, if most of this confidential
information relates to the board and executive management’s vision
for the company’s long-term future, then the recommendations from
offensive shareholder activists may look to management like they are
focused on the short term.
Yet, this argument does not necessarily make offensive
shareholder activists the purveyors of an inefficient approach to
corporate decision making in all fact patterns. Perhaps they have less
firm-specific information than management, but as compensation
they may not be prone to agency costs resulting from management
157
or an inability to breach costly implicit
shirking, rent seeking,

154. Henry T.C. Hu, Efficient Markets and the Law: A Predictable Past and an
Uncertain Future, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 179 (2012). See also Roger J. Dennis, Valuing the
Firm and the Development of Delaware Corporate Law, 17 RUTGERS L. J. 1 (1985).
155. See id. This “intrinsic value” approach has been endorsed by the Delaware courts.
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, “it is not a breach of faith for directors to
determine that the present stock market price of shares is not representative of true value or
that there may indeed be several market values for any corporation’s stock. We have so held in
another context.” Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del.
1990) (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985)). In Van Gorkom, the
court stated: “The fact that the Board had no reasonably adequate information indicative of
the intrinsic value of the Company, other than a concededly depressed market price, was
without question material to the shareholders voting on the merger.” Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
at 890. For better or worse, intrinsic value is the default principle of corporate law. See Black &
Kraakman, supra note 144, at 557.
156. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 141.
157. According to Professors Matsusaka and Ozbas, “[f]acing an active shareholder who
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agreements. Alternatively, offensive shareholder activists may have
relatively better decision-making skills in a particular area of
159
This is the inference that we believe is generated by
expertise.
empirical work on offensive shareholder activism, counteracting the
intrinsic value argument.
B. Proxy Access
Proxy access is one area which can immediately benefit from the
elimination of the idea that activist hedge funds are practitioners of
short-termism. Proxy access allows certain shareholders “the ability
to place their director nominees alongside the board’s slate of
director nominees in the company’s proxy card and proxy
160
statement.” Recently, the SEC amended Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to allow
shareholder proposals on proxy access to become part of a public
161
company’s proxy materials. Sharfman has previously argued that
proxy access proposals, if they must be proposed and approved by a
majority of shareholders, should not include a minimum holding
period for shareholders to participate in nominating a candidate for
162
Such a requirement would essentially deny
board membership.
offensive shareholder activists the ability to participate in proxy
access. These activists want to participate in the corporate decisionmaking process now, not in two or three years from now, and unlike
seeks to maximize profit, a manager suffering from an agency problem may compromise by
choosing an action that is closer to profit maximization than would otherwise have been
chosen.” Matsusaka & Ozbas, supra note 119, at 3.
158. See Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 42, at 417 n.151 (citing
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1991)).
159. See ARROW, supra note 42, at 74.
160. See Sharfman, Why Proxy Access is Harmful, supra note 42, at 388.
161. On September 15, 2011, the SEC published a release providing notice that the
amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8), allowing for shareholder proposals on proxy access, is to be
effective with the publication of the notice in the Federal Register. See Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 9259, 101 SEC Docket 3784 (Sept. 15,
2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 232, 240, 249). The notice was published in the Federal
Register on September 20, 2011. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 76 Fed.
Reg. 58, 100-01 (Sept. 20, 2011). Prior to the recently enacted Section 112 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law, an argument could have been made that proxy access proposals
were not a proper subject for action by shareholders under state law, and therefore could be
excluded from a company’s proxy materials under SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(1). Section 112 explicitly
authorizes, but does not require, bylaws granting shareholders access to the corporation’s
proxy materials to nominate directors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2011).
162. See Sharfman, Why Proxy Access is Harmful, supra note 42, at 409–10.

1049

01.SHARFMAN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

5/22/2015 4:56 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2014

the majority of shareholders, have made the necessary investment to
understand the company. It is hard to understand the logic in having
a two- or three-year holding period that favors passive investors such
as liquidity traders over information traders such as offensive
shareholders activists. Investors who have held large amounts of
company stock for 20 years in one or more portfolios using passive
strategies, and therefore do not analyze information about the
company targeted for proxy access, are generally much less qualified
to utilize proxy access than investors who have held company stock
for six months but made their decision to invest based on
fundamental analysis and the desire to implement significant change
at a corporation.
V. CONCLUSION
A model of corporate governance that gives great deference to
board authority is not inconsistent with tools of accountability that
require a sharing of that authority under certain fact patterns. For
example, under corporate law, judges and chancellors give great
deference to board authority under the business judgment rule
unless they find that such decisions were tainted with established
filters such as gross negligence, conflict of interest, or lack of
163
independence. At that point, judges and chancellors have the right
to weigh in on the merits of the decision.
For our purposes, the issue is identifying when, if ever,
shareholder activism should lead to a similar sharing of decision
making with shareholders. That is, how can we identify when
shareholder activism is of value to corporate decision making?
Identifying the value of shareholder activism begins with empirical
studies that identify which types of shareholder activism will, in
164
general, enhance shareholder wealth. So far, empirical evidence has
163. See Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 42, at 392.
164. Even though it is beyond the scope of the Article, it should be noted that the only
type of corporate governance activism that has been empirically demonstrated to enhance
shareholder wealth is that associated with the elimination of staggered boards. Multiple
empirical studies support the argument that staggered boards reduce shareholder wealth. See,
e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887,
890–91 (2002); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN.
ECON. 409, 410 (2005); Alma Cohen & Charles C. Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect
Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment 1, 3–4 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Acct. &
Mgmt. Unit, Working Paper No. 13-068, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
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only been able to demonstrate that one type of performance-driven
activism—offensive shareholder activism associated with “the sale of
the company or changes in business strategy, such as refocusing and
165
spinning-off noncore assets” —will, in general, enhance
shareholder wealth.
From a theoretical standpoint, the empirical evidence provided
allows us to argue that certain types of offensive shareholder activism
have the potential to act as a legitimate corrective mechanism in an
Arrowian framework of corporate governance. As such, these types
of offensive shareholder activism are consistent with the traditional
authority model of corporate law and governance, even accepting, as
Bainbridge has stated, that the “[p]reservation of managerial
166
discretion should always be the null hypothesis.”

abstract=2141410. But see, K. J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe,
Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited (July 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364165 (finding staggered boards to be
positively associated with shareholder wealth maximization).
However, empirical studies have not been able to show that corporate governance
activism targeting other types of corporate governance arrangements enhances shareholder
wealth. According to Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, corporate governance activism does
not enhance shareholder wealth when it involves an attempt to repeal takeover defenses,
replace a CEO, increase board independence, or limit CEO compensation. Brav et al., supra
note 97, at 1731. Bhagat and Black demonstrate that enhanced board independence does not
increase shareholder wealth. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship
Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 924, 928, 932 (1999).
See also Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of
Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101,
101–04 (1985). Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach describe studies that show how splitting the
CEO and chairman of the board positions does not enhance shareholder wealth. Renée B.
Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in
Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58,
81–82 (2010) (surveying the literature on the separation of CEO and Chairman). Ali C.
Akyol, Wei Fen Lim, and Patrick Verwijmeren find statistically significant negative returns
associated with the SEC’s attempts to provide proxy access to certain shareholders. Ali C.
Akyol, Wei Fen Lim, & Patrick Verwijmeren, Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of
the SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Director Nominations, 47 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
1029 (2012). See also Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage
Shareholder Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (2012). Such
studies create a presumption that activism encouraging such corporate governance
arrangements are not good for the target firm and therefore requires the activist to make a
convincing case that such changes can indeed enhance shareholder value. In contrast to
offensive shareholder activism, the burden of proof is now on the activist, not the other way
around.
165. Brav et al., supra note 97, at 1731.
166. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 42, at 109.
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